University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2014

Concentrated Ownership and Corporate Control: Wallenberg
Sphere and Samsung Group
Hwa-Jin Kim

Seoul National University; University of Michigan Law School, lbfk@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/1763

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the
Law and Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Kim, Hwa-Jin. "Concentrated Ownership and Corporate Control: Wallenberg Sphere and Samsung Group."
J. Korean L. 14, no. 1 (2014): 39-59.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

Journal of Korean Law | Vol. 14, 39-59, December 2014

Concentrated Ownership and Corporate
Control: Wallenberg Sphere and Samsung
Group*
Hwa-Jin Kim**

Abstract
Samsung Group’s success cannot be attributed to its corporate governance structure, at
least thus far. The corporate governance of Samsung has been rather controversial. As the group
faces the succession issue the corporate governance has become as crucial as their new products
and services. Samsung has discovered a role model on the other side of the planet, Wallenberg
Sphere in Sweden. Much effort has been made to learn about Wallenberg’s arrangements and
key to its success. However, a fundamental difference between the institutions in Sweden and
Korea has made the corporate structures of the two groups radically different. Wallenberg uses
the dual-class commons whereas Samsung relies upon the circular shareholdings through
affiliated firms. This Essay explains and analyzes the two different institutions and corporate
structures, and argues that the introduction of the dual-class commons in Korea would make the
corporate governance of Samsung more transparent and efficient, if and only if accompanied by
Samsung’s commitment to socially responsible corporate citizenship. This Essay also explains
and analyzes the recent developments in corporate governance of non-banking financial
institutions in Korea and looks into the issue from the perspective of Samsung’s structure in
comparison with Wallenberg’s structure.
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I. Introduction
The Wallenberg Sphere of Sweden and Samsung Group of Korea share
many things in common. Both are the flagship business conglomerates in
their respective countries, significantly contributing to each nation’s GDP.1)
Both of them exercise substantial influence on the politics and society in
their countries due to the sheer volume of their production capabilities and
number of employees, suppliers and customers.
From the perspective of corporate governance, they are controlled by
the members of a family through concentrated ownership and other legal
and practical arrangements.2) For that reason, along with the economic
power concentration concern, Wallenberg used to be, and Samsung has
been highly controversial for many years. And perhaps for that reason
again, the two groups of companies and their people in charge remain close
to each other,3) having developed some sort of moral alliance and personal
friendships. Given that Korea and Sweden historically were not closely
related to each other, it is remarkable that Wallenberg’s name has become
quite recognizable in the Korean industry circle, and Samsung is
responsible for it.
This Essay will explain and briefly analyze the corporate governance
issues in the two groups from the perspective of comparative corporate

1) Samsung Group’s some 60 companies, including Samsung Electronics and Samsung
Life Insurance, accounted for 13% of Korea’s GDP in 2011. See Simon Mundy and Song
Jung-a, Mighty Samsung Weighs Heavy on S. Korea, Financial Times, Nov. 14, 2012, http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/428f8538-248b-11e2-b38c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3M2KroOGe.
The Wallenbergs owned some 40% of the value of the listed companies in Sweden by the late
1990s. See The Wallenbergs: Sweden’s enduring business dynasty, The Economist, Oct. 12, 2006,
http://www.economist.com/node/8023389.
2) Concentrated ownership has been the hallmark of Asian and European firms. See
Concentrated Corporate Ownership (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000). But, current scholarship
shows us that even in the United States the ownership of large firms is now highly
concentrated, not with families but with institutional investors. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey
N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of
Governance Rights, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 863 (2013); Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse
Ownership in the United States, 22 Review of Financial Studies 1377 (2007).
3) See Powerful Swedish Family Arrives in Korea for Conference, The Dong-A Ilbo, March 18,
2012, http://english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?biid=2012031922478.
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law, practice, and finance. As a matter of fact, it is not a secret that Samsung
regards Wallenberg as its model in corporate governance, control, and
citizenship. In particular, Samsung is interested in learning the way
Wallenberg managed the corporate social responsibility issue and family
control succession problem. One of the keys to understanding Wallenberg’s
“secret of success” lies in Sweden’s corporate governance institutions
which currently are not available to Samsung as a Korean corporate group.
This Essay will focus on those differences and propose some institutional
and practical changes to Samsung as well as the Korean government.

II. The Wallenberg Model4)
1. Corporate Structure
The Swedish model of corporate governance gained much attention
ever since the comparative corporate governance scholarship was born in
the United States.5) Ronald Gilson is well known to be a big fan of the
Swedish model. Gilson designated the Swedish model as an “efficient
controlling shareholder system,”6) based obviously on the conventional
wisdom that the controlling (minority) shareholder system 7) was not
efficient.
The hallmark of the Wallenberg corporate structure is its family control
over the entire group of companies, including such giants as Ericsson,
Scania and ABB, through the dual-class commons owned by Investor, the

4) For Wallenberg and Swedish economy in general, see Lennart Schön, An Economic
History of Modern Sweden (2012).
5) See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Investment Companies as Guardian
Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in the Corporate Governance Debate, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 985
(1993). See also Peter Högfeldt, The History and Politics of Corporate Ownership in Sweden, in A
History of Corporate Governance Around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional
Managers 517 ( 2005).
6) See Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the
Comparative Taxonomy, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1641 (2006).
7) For CMS (Controlling Minority Structure), see Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids,
Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity, in Concentrated Corporate Ownership, supra note 2, at
295.
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main company. Investor, in turn, is owned by the Wallenberg Foundations
at 22% in equity and 46% in votes. Gilson even calls the dual-class
commons structure as the “Swedish capital structure.” In the Swedish
capital structure “the founders retained stock with many times the voting
power of the class of common stock sold to the public.”8) The Wallenberg
family has maintained control over the group through an arrangement that
creates huge discrepancy between their cash flow right and control right.
Such a discrepancy typically is characterized as a sign of bad corporate
governance by most scholarly opinions. 9) However, the Wallenberg
structure is an exception and accepted by the Swedish society largely due to
Wallenberg’s social commitments and lack of self-dealing and family
members’ entrenchment. The Wallenberg family controls and runs the
businesses, but it does not “own” the franchise. No private benefit of
control is known to be enjoyed by the family.

2. Corporate Citizenship
Much has been written about Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish version of
Oskar Schindler, who rescued tens of thousands Jews in Nazi-occupied
Hungary during the later stages of the Second World War.10) The story fits
very well with the Wallenberg’s image of a conglomerate that has
consistently tried to resonate with the Swedish society as a socially
responsible corporate citizen. The Wallenberg Foundations also extensively
support scientific research, higher education and the arts in Sweden.
The Wallenberg concentrates on such major businesses as aerospace,
machinery and telecommunications, leaving other areas of business to
small enterprises.11) It also recognizes the labor union as partner, not party

8) See Gilson, supra note 6 at 1660.
9) See, e.g., Stijn Claessens et al., The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian
Corporations, 58 Journal of Financial Economics 81 (2000).
10) See, e.g., Kati Marton, Wallenberg: The Incredible True Story of the Man Who Saved
Budapest (2011); Alex Kershaw, The Envoy: The Epic Rescue of the Last Jews of
Europe in the Desperate Closing Months of World War II (2010).

the Jews of

11) In Korea, big business groups expanded into small areas such as bakeries, restaurants
and grocery stores. The problem is that those businesses are regularly run by children or
relatives of controlling-shareholder managers of the business groups. This created outrage in
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on the other side of the table representing the conflicting interest. This goes
back to the tri-party Saltsjöbaden Agreement that was signed by Swedish
Trade Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen: LO) and Swedish
Employers’ Confede-ration (Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen: SAF) on
December 20, 1938 under the auspices of the government. Instead of
nationalizing business groups’ assets, the Swedish government and labor
unions recognized the business groups’ vested interests. Through the
arrangement, they could keep the big businesses in Swedish territory, and
gain their support for further social reform. Employers, in return, did agree
to take higher corporate tax burden. This industrial relations regime did
survive the far-reaching labor legislation around 1970, and remained
effective until superseded by the Industrial Agreement of 1997, the new
labor market regime in Sweden.12)

III. The Samsung Issue in Korea
Corporate governance in Korea has “again” become a hot political and
social issue. The Korean economy has long been dominated by Chaebols,13)
large corporate conglomerates, including Samsung Group, throughout its
past. Although corporate governance of Korean firms in general has
significantly improved over time, the concentration of economic and even
political powers on Chaebols have become more intense.14) Samsung stands
in the middle of controversy. Although Samsung Group is a private

the public opinion and led to the establishment of the National Commission for Corporate
Partnership in 2010 under the Daejungsogieop Sangsaeng Chokjine gwanhan beobyul [Law
for Promotion of Coexistence and Partnership between Big and Small and Medium Size
Enterprises].
12) See Nils Elvander, Two Labour Market Regimes in Sweden: A Comparison Between the
Saltsjöbaden Agreement of 1938 and the Industrial Agreement of 1997, 10 Industrielle Beziehungen
146 (2003).
13) See Jeong Seo, Who Will Control Frankenstein? The Korean Chaebol’s Corporate Governance,
14 C ardozo J. I nt ’ l & C omp . L aw 21 (2006); M yung H un K ang , T he K orean B usiness
Conglomerate: Chaebol Then and Now (1996).
14) See Corporate Kingpins Living on Borrowed Time, Korea JoongAng Daily, Dec. 7, 2012,
http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=2963561 (reporting that
a total of 30 largest conglomerates accounted for 95% of GDP in 2011).
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business entity comprised of public and private companies, the public, the
media and politicians closely follow its governance because it has heavy
impacts on the markets and the nation’s economy.15) Ever since the 2008
global financial crisis, antagonism amongst general population against
Chaebols in general16) and Samsung in particular has grown significantly,
while some corporate scandals and political campaigns did contribute to
the trend.

1. Succession Problem
The controlling shareholder-managers of many Chaebols face the
succession problem, with some of them committing questionable acts in the
succession process causing big scandals and ending up standing before law
enforcement agencies and courts.17)
The best way to understand Samsung’s issues is probably looking into
its succession problem. It all starts with Cheil Industries (formerly Samsung
Everland), a theme park housing lots of zoo animals like lions and tigers.
Everland practically functions as the holding company of the Samsung
Group. It controls Samsung Life Insurance, and in turn, the insurance giant
controls Samsung Electronics, the flagship of the group. According to the
Financial Times, as of December 2013 Samsung Electronics was the world’s
thirteenth largest company right after Johnson & Johnson and followed by
China Mobile.
Until December 2014, Cheil remained as a private firm owned largely
by members of the Lee family. 18) Cheil is the Samsung version of

15) Cf. Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 Law and Contemp. Probs. 137
(2011) (discussing increased “publicness” and the role of government in corporate governance
of large public companies).
16) See, e.g., Simon Munday, South Korean Companies: Needed on the Home Front, Financial
T imes , Nov. 18, 2003, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c63ed192-4bac-11e3-a02f00144feabdc0.html#axzz3M2KroOGe.
17) See Hwa-Jin Kim, Seung-Hwan Lee & Stephen Woodcock, Favoritism and Corporate
Law: The Confused Corporate Opportunity Doctrine in the Hyundai Motor Case, 3 Michigan
Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review 41 (2013).
18) The average ownership of the controlling shareholders of non-public member firms of
Samsung Group was 78.43%, whereas their cash-flow rights were as low as 19.43%. For public
member firms the number was 13.52% and 1.14%, respectively. See James Jinho Chang &
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Wallenberg’s Investor. So, if control over Cheil gets passed on, the control
over the whole group passes on. The question is to whom. Samsung’s
Chairman Lee has three children, a son and two daughters. They hold
controlling shares in Cheil and some shares in other affiliate companies of
the group. In 1996, an important decision was made. Where Cheil
(Everland) offered a substantial amount of convertible bonds to the
shareholders with preemptive rights. Almost all of the shareholders turned
down the offer. Everland then “found” willing buyers from outside, Lee’s
children. The son got the lion’s share and became the new largest
shareholder in Everland. It seemed as if control over the group had been
smoothly passed on to the son. However, the story had a surprising twist.
Five years after the transaction, some 43 law professors brought
criminal charges against the Everland managers. They thought that the
price of convertible bonds was too low, resulting in a very cheap transfer of
corporate control to the son to the detriment of the company’s financials.
After years of a lengthy and painful courtroom debacle, the Korean
Supreme Court ultimately decided, by a five to four judgment, that the
defendants were not guilty.19) The Supreme Court’s judgment made the
son’s control over Everland legitimate, but the control and succession issue
has not been solved yet.
The ultimate trouble is that the whole corporate structure of the
Samsung Group has been built on the roundabout circular shareholding.20)
Samsung Life controls Samsung Electronics, which controls Samsung Card,
and Samsung Card in turn holds a sizable share in Samsung Life.21) It is
now too big an entity for a family to maintain effective control without such
an arrangement. It is almost like the Lee family controls the entire group
Hyun-Han Shin, Family Ownership and Performance in Korean Conglomerates, 15 Pacific-Basin
Finance Journal 329 (2007).
19) Supreme Court [S.Ct], 2005No2371, May 29, 2009 (S. Kor.). The entire judgment is
available in K im H wa -J in , G ieobjibaegujowa G ieobgeumyung [C orporate F inance and
Governance] 462-482 (2d ed., 2012) (S. Kor.).
20) See generally, Chun Kyung-Hoon, Sunhwanchuljaui Beobjeog Munje [Legal Issues of the
Circular Ownership], 32-1 sangsabeobyeongu [Commercial Law Review] 97 (2013) (S. Kor.).
21) This structure comes up in the United States, too. See Speiser v. Baker, 525 A.2d 1001
(Del. Ch. 1987). In Germany, they call it “Ringförmige Mehrheitsbeteiligungen.” See Friedrich
Kübler, Gesellschaftsrecht 362 (5th ed. 1998) (suggesting potential liability of directors who
created the structure).
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through other people’s money. On top of that, as Chairman Lee gets older,
his two ambitious daughters may require their fair shares in the group.
Also, they will have to pay inheritance taxes through selling the shares. To
make the matter more difficult, two financial institutions, Samsung Life and
Samsung Card, are involved in the structure, which invites political
interference and, accordingly, makes the whole issue more difficult to
solve.

2. Social Responsibility
From the perspective of stakeholder capitalism,22) Samsung’s track
record does not look that impressive. The most notable example is
Samsung’s decades long policy against labor unions. Also, its history has
been tainted with such scandals as tax evasions and corrupt practices.23)
Chairman Lee once stepped down from his office when the former general
counsel of the group spoke out after the former public prosecutor met with
some Catholic priests. 24) A special prosecutor was appointed by the
parliament, found some wrongdoings and indicted Lee. Samsung was
forced to pledge for socially responsible management and committed a
significant amount of funds for that purpose. This is the point where
Samsung became eager to learn from Wallenberg’s experiences.
The Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance25) adopted by the
Korean Committee on Corporate Governance in September 1999 declares
that “[t]he corporation shall not be negligent in its social responsibilities,

22) See generally, Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial
Autonomyand Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance, 50 Harv. Int’l L.J. 129
(2009); Lynn Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth (2012).
23) The family has also been involved in an inheritance dispute. See Court Sides with
Samsung Electronics Chairman in Family Feud, Wall Street Journal, Feb. 1, 2013, http://www.
wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323701904578277002155753668; Feud Among Samsung
Descendants Heats Up, New York Times, Nov. 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/
15/business/global/feud-among-samsung-descendants-heats-up.html.
24) He even wrote a book on his experiences in Samsung. K im Y ong C hul ,
[Thinking Samsung] (2010) (S. Kor.).

samseongeul

saenggaghanda

25) G i e o b j i b a e g u j o w o n [C o m m i tt e e o n C o r p o r a t e G o v e r n a n c e ], G i e o b j i b a e g u j o
Mobeomgyujun [Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance] (Sept. 1999) (S. Kor.)
[hereinafter The Code].

No. 1: 2014

Concentrated Ownership and Corporate Control | 47

such as consumer protection and environmental protection.”26) Actually, the
notion that corporations are socially responsible27) was already widespread
and well accepted under the authoritarian military governments from the
1960s through the 1980s. This notion is also related to the popular concept
that socially responsible and “patriotic” business managers greatly
contribute to the economic development of their “fatherland.”
Socially responsible companies have been popular in Korea along the
way. For instance, pharmaceutical companies act and present themselves
almost like charitable institutions. Big companies build hospitals, museums
and schools and establish endowments.28) Samsung also runs one of the
finest hospitals in Korea. Cheil, together with Samsung Life, has a guide
dogs program with many labrador retrievers. Whenever a national disaster
occurs, the media enthusiastically reports on contributions made by the
companies with references to the amounts contributed, sometimes ranked
by size. The websites of major corporations in Korea, including those of
Samsung and LG, very proudly introduce how they value the concept of
corporate social responsibility and that their performance has been in line
with such a concept.
On the other hand, there were and are many controlling shareholdermanagers in Korea who voluntarily assume unlimited responsibility for
their companies. They take the financial responsibility of their firms on
themselves by issuing guarantees for the firms’ debt, and by other methods,

26) Id. Section IV-1.3 (“With the significant rise of corporation’s influence on the economy
and society, similarly increasing has been the recognition of general public’s concern about
corporation’s social responsibilities. Also, consumers and regional societies have been
increasing in importance as interested parties in the continuance of the corporation. In
particular, if the corporation neglects its social responsibilities, such as protecting consumer
rights or the environment using its vantage, it will, unlike the past, lead to a very adverse
effect on its long-term development as well as to a decline in its image. Therefore, each
corporation shall enable its managers to faithfully perform its social responsibilities through
an appropriate governance system.”).
27) See generally Stephen J. Brammer & Stephen Pavelin, Corporate Governance and
Corporate Social Responsibility, in The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Governance 719 (Mike
Wright et al. eds., 2013).
28) Like Wallenbergs did, some of the endowments and foundations were used to place
part of a controlling block of shares in friendly hands. Such a practice was also popular
because it could mitigate the inheritance tax burden without diluting control. The Korean
government took some measures to curb the practice in 1997 through a tax law reform.
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voluntarily giving up the benefit of the limited liability principle as they
put their personal properties into the corporation when the firm is in
trouble to save the firm and employees’ jobs and even compensate for
losses incurred by the firm’s customers. This would be surprising if it were
to happen in a Fortune 500 International public firm.29)
However, most legal scholars in Korea are skeptical about bringing the
concept of corporate social responsibility into a statute.30) Corporate social
responsibility, however good it may be, may become a simple “guidance”
that does not help judges.31) It is argued that it is not clear who is the legal
beneficiary of the directors’ obligation to act in a socially responsible way.
Also, such a law may be abused under sensitive and unstable political
circumstances. Management might use the concept to sacrifice shareholder
interests.32) Korean corporate law as it stands today does not provide the
non-shareholder stakeholders of a corporation with any kind of legal right
as far as corporate governance is concerned. Non-shareholder stakeholders
can only protect their legitimate interests through contract, tax and labor
law.33)
Korea is currently also under the strong influence of the paradigm

29) Also, Korean banks usually require the controlling-shareholder managers and other
key officers to issue personal guarantees for a firm’s debts. The Korean banking practice
heavily relies upon secured lending. If the firm fails, the controlling-shareholder manager
loses everything, unless he or she runs some kind of safety funds.
30) See, e.g., Lee Chul Song,
Kor.).

hoesabeob gangui

[Corporate Law] 66-67 (20th ed. 2012) (S.

31) But see William T. Allen et al., Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business
Organization 232 (4th ed. 2012) (“[T]here is social value to announcing a standard.. that is not
enforced with a liability rule.”).
32) In Japan, the House of Representatives resolved twice (in 1973 and 1981) to require the
government to codify the concept, but nothing happened. See Lee, supra note 30, at 66.
33) See Section IV-1.2 of The Code: “The corporation shall make every effort to maintain
and improve labor conditions by faithfully observing labor-related statutes such as the Labor
Standard Act.” See also Section IV-2.1 of The Code: “The form and level of management
monitoring by creditors shall be determined through discussion among the related parties,
according to the corporation’s distinctive qualities.” The Korean Act on Worker Participation
and Promotion of Cooperation is basically a labor law statute that enforces convening of
labor-management consultative meetings, during which employers are required to report and
explain the business plans/strategies, matters concerning their implementation, quarterly
production plans and performances, personnel plans, and the corporation’s financial status.
So, it cannot be compared with the German co-determination.
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change that took place after the global financial crisis and ‘Occupy Wall
Street’ campaign. In the presidential election of 2012, all candidates
promised to do something about the current model of economy. The
discussion of corporate social responsibility has regained the focus in the
context of ‘economic democracy.’ As the biggest business entity in Korea,
Samsung is under pressure and should come up with a new idea and
policy that may satisfactorily answer the requirements newly made by
Korean society.

3. The Case for Dual-Class Commons
The dual-class common stock structure, or the “Swedish capital
structure” as Gilson puts it, is popular in Europe34) but it is also widely used
in the United States35) in the big public companies as well as venture capitalbacked companies undergoing IPOs.36) The most well-known example of
the concentrated ownership with the dual-class structure in the U.S. is
Berkshire Hathaway, one of the most profitable and respected firms in the
world.37) The difference between Berkshire, Wallenberg and Samsung is
that Berkshire is under the control of individual managers led by Warren
Buffett,38) not families. The enterprise has neither been inherited nor faces
the bloodline succession problem.
The dual-class structure is regarded as an antitakeover arrangement,39)
34) ISS Europe, ECGI, Shearman & Sterling, Report on the Proportionality Principle in the
European Union (May 18, 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/
docs/shareholders/study/final_report_en.pdf.
35) See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of
Shareholder Choice, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1988).
36) See, e.g., Laura Field & Jonathan Karpoff, Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms, 57 Journal of
Finance 1857 (2002).
37) By conventional standards, the corporate governance of Berkshire cannot be
positively evaluated. The gap between cash flow right and control right is big. Its aging board
does not look that independent, etc. Perhaps, the firm represents the extremely rare
benevolent dictatorship model that makes all discussions trivial.
38) See Alice Schroeder, The Snowball: Warren Buffett and the Business of Life (2009).
39) See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 713 (2003); Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm
Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. Econ. & Org. 83 (2001); Michael Klausner, Fact
and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 1325, 1332-1336 (2013) (discussing
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but that is not all that it does. The dual class share system is relatively more
transparent compared to cross-shareholdings or pyramid type structures.40)
If the dual-class stock system is abolished, the relevant companies will
restructure the corporate governance through adopting cross-shareholding
or creating a pyramid to protect its incumbent manager’s vested interests.41)
One of the reasons that the Korean Chaebols use complicated
shareholding structures is a legal one. The Korean Commercial Code
(hereinafter KCC) does not allow firms to issue dual-class common stocks.
The one-share-one-vote rule in the KCC42) has been regarded as mandatory
and, may not be opted out through charter provisions. Large Korean firms
have been growing so rapidly that the controlling shareholder-managers
could not keep up with the speed of their firms’ growths. In order to avoid
the dilution of their shareholding, they built the massive circular
shareholding structures and inter-locking directorships. They control
practically one business entity with very little direct investment. Ironically,
the ban on dual-class commons has made the corporate structure of Korean
conglomerates less transparent.
Like it or not, Samsung Group’s future may determine at least the near
future of the Korean economy. Together with Hyundai Motor Company
Group, Samsung is the only Korean business organization that remains
competitive in the ever challenging global markets. If one does not wish
Samsung’s failure due to its corporate governance issues, and given that

the staggered board).
40) Hwa-Jin Kim, The Case for Market for Corporate Control in Korea, 8 Journal
Law 227, 273 (2008) (S. Kor.).

of

Korean

41) See Lucian Bebchuk & Oliver Hart, A Threat to Dual-Class Shares, Financial Times, May
31, 2002, http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/pdfs/FT.Dual.Class.Share.2002.
pdf. But see Ronald Masuliset al., Agency Problems at Dual-Class Companies, 64 Journal of
Finance (2009) (finding evidence supporting the hypothesis that managers with greater
control rights in excess of cash-flow rights are more likely to pursue private benefits at the
expense of outside shareholders).
42) Sangbeob [Commercial Act], art. 369, para. 1 (S. Kor.). For the rule, see generally
Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, One Share – One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control, 20
Journal of Financial Economics 175 (1988); Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Large Shareholders
and Corporate Control, 94 Journal of Political Economy 461 (1986); Shaun Martin & Frank
Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 775 (2005). See also Bernard Black & Reinier
Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1911, 1945-1946 (1996)
(finding that the one share one vote regime has value).
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Samsung itself cannot solve the problems they have satisfactorily,
legislative measures will become inevitable to the extent that they do not
violate the constitution and fundamental principle of economic justice.
Introduction of the dual-class commons into the KCC may well contribute
to the solution under the condition that Samsung follows suit of
Wallenberg in terms of corporate citizenship.
To be sure, it is beyond the scope of this Essay to figure out how
Samsung may use the dual-class commons in its restructuring, if
introduced. It may use methods such as conventional coercive exchange
offers43) and adding new classes.44) Numerous factors shall be taken into
account in such a restructuring and unforeseen barriers may also come up
with any plan. The Korea Exchange listing rules may also become an issue
when a dual-class recapitalization causes the reduction or restriction of
existing shareholder voting rights.45) The current rules, of course, do not
know of the dual-class recapitalization. Nevertheless, it is certain that
Samsung may enjoy more flexibility benefiting the new legal environment.
Perhaps, the holding structure — as discussed below — with a dual-class
regime comparable to Investor in the Wallenberg Sphere may provide
Samsung with a good example.
On a different note, the dual-class scheme may provide the capital
markets with new energy and liquidity that would contribute to the
investor protection. The historic IPO of Alibaba in September of 2014
reignited discussions on the dual-class commons in that context. The Hong
Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) lost the USD25 billion deal to the New York
Stock Exchange46) through standing by its one-share-one-vote rule.47) The

43) See, e.g., Richard S. Ruback, Coercive Dual-Class Exchange Offers, 20 J ournal
Financial Economics 153 (1988).

of

44) See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, New Share Class Gives Google Founders Tighter Control,
DealBook, Apr. 13, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/13/new-share-class-givesgoogle-founders-tighter-control/?_r=0.
45) Cf. NYSE Listed Company Manual § 313 (2014); NASDAQ Listing Rules § IM-5640
(2014).
46) See NYSE to Run Software Tests for Trading Firms Ahead of Alibaba IPO, New York Times,
July 1, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/01/us-ice-nyse-alibaba-groupidUSKBN0F64X920140701.
47) Cf. Hong Kong Stock Exchange Main Board Listing Rules § 8.11 (2014). See Paul
Davies, Alibaba’s Demands Have Echoes in Hong Kong’s History, Financial Times, Oct. 2, 2013,
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HKEx has now indicated that it would consider relaxing the rule as it may
lose a generation of companies from China’s new economy by sticking to
the current rule.48) It also is worth noting that the securities regulation and
stock exchange rules are not just consumer protection norms. Stock
exchanges and financial services industries of the world are under intense
pressure from global competition, and the capital market laws of the world
could not afford to ignore it.49) Korea is no exception.

IV. Industry and Finance
The Wallenberg Sphere structured the group into two segments, i.e.,
financial group and non-financial operational group. The two groups are
controlled by Investor, but managed independently. On the finance side,
now almost 160 year old bank Enskilda Banken (SEB) is in charge. The
Wallenberg established Investor for SEB’s holdings some one hundred
years ago, when the law restricted bank ownership of shares in industrial
firms.

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/008fcfac-29b3-11e3-bbb8-00144feab7de.
html#axzz3M2KroOGe.
48) At the end of the day though, instead of offering dual-class commons, Alibaba came
up with an even questionable arrangement from the perspective of shareholder right. What
investors actually purchased are shares in a Cayman Islands entity called Alibaba Group
Holding Limited. The actual business entity in China is contractually obliged to give the
Cayman corporation 100% of the profits which are only enforceable in a Chinese court. See
Shareholder Rights: Out of Control, The Economist, Sept. 20, 2014, http://www.economist.com/
node/21618889 (“More of the world’s big stock markets are allowing firms like Alibaba to
sideline their shareholders”); See also Lucian Bebchuk, Alibaba’s Governance Leaves Investors at a
Disadvantage, DealBook, Sept. 16, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/16/alibabasgovernance-leaves-investors-at-a-disadvantage/.
49) Kim Hwa-Jin, Jabonsijangbeob ilon [Theoretical Foundations of Securities Regulation]
3-4 (2014) (S. Kor.). See also Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of
Securities Regulation, 55 Duke L.J. 711, 713 (2006); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser,
Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 761, 802 (1985);
Barbara Grunewald & Michael Schlitt, Einführung in das Kapitalmarktrecht 3 (3d. ed. 2014);
Petra Buck-Heeb, Kapitalmarktrecht 3-7 (6th ed. 2013).
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1. The Issue
As mentioned above, the typical Korean conglomerate structure,
including that of Samsung, is characterized by cross as well as circular
shareholdings amongst affiliated companies. Many of them are private
companies about which not much information is available to the outside.
These firms conduct significant volumes of related party transactions.50)
However, what if the related party transactions were to take place
involving financial institutions?
Ownership in Korean commercial banks is highly dispersed. Major
banks are owned by foreign investors with no controlling interest. Under
the Banking Act, there is a ten percent basic ceiling on bank ownership by a
single shareholder.51) It is understood that the ceiling was introduced to
effectively bar the Chaebols’, in particular Samsung’s, ownership in
commercial banks. The only issue is that the government exercises a huge
influence on the corporate governance of banks.52) On the other hand, nonbanking financial institutions in Korea are members of big corporate
groups, the Chaebols. The ownership in such financial institutions, securities
firms, insurance companies, and savings banks, etc., is concentrated. They
are under the control of controlling shareholder-managers or affiliated
firms which again are controlled by families or individuals. The trouble is
that the non-banking financial institutions have other important
stakeholders besides managers, employees and shareholders, i.e., customers
and taxpayers. The deposit insurance program also applies to the
institutions. Moral hazard and conflict of interests as exemplified by recent

50) See Kim et al., supra note 17, at 44-49 (Hyundai Motor Group case); Son Young Hoa,
Gieobjibdannae Naebugeolaee gwanhan yeongu [Studies on the Internal Transaction in Corporate
Group], 32-1 Sangsabeobyeongu [Commercial Law Review] 159 (2013). See generally Gerard
Hertig & Hideki Kanda, Related Party Transactions, in The Anatomy of Corporate Law 101
(2004).
51) Eunhaengbeob [Banking Act], art. 15, para. 1 (S. Kor.).
52) Hwa-Jin Kim, Taking International Soft Law Seriously: Its Implications for Global
Convergence in Corporate Governance, 1 Journal of Korean Law 1 (2001) (S. Kor.); Hwa-Jin Kim,
Living with the IMF: A New Approach to Corporate Governance and Regulation of Financial
Institutions in Korea, 17 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 61 (1999).
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scandals53) should be addressed through proper corporate governance
arrangements and financial regulations.
The Korean government and law makers have been struggling with the
issue of ‘separation of industry and finance.’54) The core of the discussion is
if the law should ban industrial firms’ control over financial firms, i.e.,
whether Korea should ban or restrict ownership in non-banking financial
institutions by operational companies in corporate groups which are
controlled by families. The concern here is that industrial firms may abuse
financial firms, and their investors and customers, for the benefit of their
shareholders, including the controlling shareholder and his or her family
members. Again, Samsung is in the middle of the controversy because
Samsung Group comprises of financial and non-financial operational firms
under the ultimate control of a family.

2. Pros and Cons
Opinions favoring the separation are based on mistrust in the financial
supervisory system. As a matter of fact, the savings bank scandal and the
recent failure of some non-banking financial institutions support the
validity of the claim for separation. Ex post regulation cannot be trusted.

53) The savings banks scandal in 2011 was a reincarnation of the savings and loans
scandals in the United States in 1990s. The controlling shareholder-managers of the troubled
savings banks simply stole money from their banks due to the lack of stringent supervision.
Briberies were also involved in some cases. Reform efforts have largely been unsuccessful due
to lobbies to the lawmakers. But, most savings banks were not members of big corporate
groups. Recent scandals involve member firms of big corporate groups. One such example is
Tongyang Group, which failed in 2013. It turned out that Tongyang Securities sold corporate
bonds issued by ailing affiliates to its customers assuring that the issuers were sound. Many
customers were attracted by an unusually high interest rate, so they were aware of the
potential risks, but apparently took the risk believing in ‘too big to fail.’ See Tongyang
Investigation Widens, Korea JoongAng Daily, Oct. 8, 2013, http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.
com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2978544&ref=mobile. Hyosung Group currently is under
criminal investigation, but it appears that they used the group’s member capital company like
a controlling shareholder family’s private cash register. See Prosecution Has Something to Prove,
Korea JoongAng Daily, Oct. 15, 2013, http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/
Article.aspx?aid=2978810.
54) See generally Kim Yong Jae, eunhaengbeobwonlon [Banking Law and Regulation] 96-194
(2d ed. 2012) (S. Kor.).

No. 1: 2014

Concentrated Ownership and Corporate Control | 55

But, the core of the pro-separation arguments is the conflicts of interest.
Families in control of the group and/or operational member firms of the
group may harm the financial firm through tunneling and/or unfairly
favoring member firms within the group, its customers and eventually
taxpayers along with systemic risk. Also, a separation may facilitate fair
competition between corporate groups with and without financial firms.
Opinions against the separation, on the other hand, emphasize that no
country regulates ex ante the new entry into the non-banking industry.
Prudential rules and tight financial supervision will ensure the soundness
of the financial institution. And, as far as economic rational is concerned, a
similar argument favoring the reinstatement of the Glass-Steagall Act of
1933 applies here, i.e., separation blocks the creation of economies of scale
and scope and prevents conglomerates from enjoying the financial synergy
with stable cash flow. As a result it may have adverse impact on the
international competitiveness of the local financial institutions and
consumer benefits.55) The argument also points out that the Korean banks
ended up being owned by foreign investors due to the ban on ownership of
Chaebols in commercial banks. The same thing can happen to the nonbanking financial institutions if more structural regulation is added.
Regarding the possibility that operational firms may abuse financial firms,
they emphasize that the reality usually works the other way around.
Operational firms within a group support financial firms through
providing business opportunities arising from the operational firms.56)
The Korean legislature has been discussing the periodic review on
controlling shareholders’ personal records. If proven that the controlling

55) For the discussion, see Hwa-Jin Kim, A Global Structural Regulation of Financial
Institutions?, 52-4 seouldaehaggyo beobhag [Seoul Law Journal] 169, 180-185 (2011) (S. Kor.);
Charles K. Whitehead, The Volcker Rule and Evolving Financial Markets, 1 Harvard Business Law
Review 39 (2011); Eugene A. Ludwig, Assessment of Dodd–Frank Financial Regulatory Reform:
Strengths, Challenges and Opportunities for a Stronger Regulatory System, 29 Yale J. on Reg. 181,
194 (2012); Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft Jr., Failure is an Option: An Ersatz–
Antitrust Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 Yale L.J. 1368, 1409-1410 (2011).
56) This is actually perceived to be the bigger problem in Korea. Financial member firms
rely too heavily upon businesses supplied by non-financial firms so that their identity and
competitiveness as financial institutions can be compromised. It also has negative impacts on
those firms’ relationship with general consumers. The Korean government has recently issued
guiding rules for related-party transactions involving financial institutions.
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shareholder or his/her relatives did commit crime or wrongdoing, the
controlling shareholder shall lose control over the firm through voting right
restriction or administrative order to dispose of the shares in the firm in the
stock market. Besides the question of whether such a drastic measure
would survive the constitutional law challenge, the financial services
industry strongly opposes the legislative move arguing that the corporate
governance of non-financial institutions can be determined by factors that
lie beyond the scope of practical control of controlling shareholders. If
adopted, the new rule can in fact be easily abused by competitors and even
unfriendly or hostile family members or relatives.57) Furthermore, in a
situation where the controlling shareholder is another company, the
corporate governance of certain financial institutions will end up being
changed by acts of another company’s employees.

3. Holding Structure Solution
The compromising idea in discussion is lifting the ban on general
holding company’s ownership in financial institutions. Under the current
Anti-monopoly and Fair Trade Act,58) a general holding company may not
control financial firms while financial holding companies are allowed to do
it.59) As an operating subsidiary cannot control financial subsidiaries in a
holding structure the separation of industry and finance can practically be
achieved. In this scenario the whole Samsung Group transforms itself into a
holding structure following the example of LG Group and SK Group,
among others, and can keep Samsung Life and other nine financial entities
within the group.

57) See Geumyungsa Daejuju Jeoggyeogseong Simsa Hwagdae [Expanding Periodic Review for
controlling shareholders of financial institutions], Korea Economic Daily, June 14, 2013, http://
www.hankyung.com/news/app/newsview.php?aid=2013061437531.
58) Dokjeomgyuje mit Gongjeonggeoraee gwanhan beobyul [Monopoly Regulation and
Fair Trade Act], art. 8-2, para. 3, no. 3 (S. Kor.).
59) The law did ban the establishment of a holding company whose primary purpose was
to control the management of a domestic company through equity ownership. The policy was
dropped in 1999 to help big corporate groups ease the restructuring and improvement of
corporate governance. For the regulation of financial holding companies (in the U.S.), see
Howell E. Jackson, The Expanding Obligations of Financial Holding Companies, 107 Harv. L. Rev.
507 (1994).
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Another idea is the mezzanine (financial) holding company. According
to this, general holding companies shall be allowed to control mezzanine
holding companies that may own financial institutions. 60) Mezzanine
holding companies will become subject to strengthened financial
supervision. This scenario offers a less expensive way for Samsung to deal
with the issue because it does not require the restructuring of the entire
group. In any case, the dual-class commons regime as in the Investor and
SEB relationship in the Wallenberg Sphere would be the practical solution
especially because it is likely that the Korean government would allow the
dual-class regime only to private companies, if at all.61)

4. The Perils of Over-Regulation
It is a very common phenomenon throughout history that politicians
and government officials supported by scholars and other experts try to
change or reform the existing system whenever a scandal takes place.
Sometimes it comes with significant regulatory costs. One of the most
recent examples is arguably the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,62) and the
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 may become another example.63) On the one hand,
it is a constructive approach. Things must be fixed if they are broken. On
the other hand, they easily forget that scandals always involve illegal and
criminal acts of those people who are responsible for damages to investors,

60) See Yeo, Jjunggan Geumyungjijusa doib jaechujin [Ruling Party to push for mezzanine
financial holding company], Chosun Biz, Nov. 24, 2014, http://biz.chosun.com/site/data/html_
dir/2014/11/24/2014112402891.html (reporting that the ruling party was ready to push the
bill).
61) See the draft article by the Korean Ministry of Justice’s expert group in Kim, supra note
40 at 274.
62) For critical assessments, see Roberta Romano, Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Have a
Future?, 26 Yale J. on Reg. 229 (2009); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making
of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 Yale L.J. 1521 (2005); William J. Carney, The Costs of Being
Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of “Going Private,” 55 Emory L.J. 141 (2006). But, see
Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1817 (2007).
63) See, e.g., Diane Katz, Dodd-Frank at Year Three: Onerous and Costly (Heritage
Foundation, Heritage Issue Brief No. 3993, July 19, 2013); Paul Rose & Christopher J. Walker,
Dodd-Frank Regulators, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Agency Capture, 66 Stanford Law Review
O nline (2013), available at http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/dodd-frankregulators-cost-benefit-analysis-and-agency-capture.
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shareholders, and the economy. It is true that Korean firms may take
advantage of the financial affiliates in bad times. However, policy should
not be formulated on a worst case and/or isolated scenario. It is like
unfairly punishing honest firms for acts committed by the bad guys. It may
also invite opportunistic behavior and corruptive practices in bureaucracy
out of the labyrinth of regulatory and supervisory details that ultimately
create further reform needs.64)
It has been discussed in the parliament that Samsung Life’s voting
rights in Samsung Electronics should be restricted through amending the
Anti-monopoly and Fair Trade Act. How the idea survives the
constitutional law challenge is not an issue for politicians. The
Constitutional Court of Korea has become the most active constitutional
law court in the world reviewing and overturning unconstitutional laws
passed by the Korean parliament. When Samsung Life in fact gets
separated from the Samsung Group structure, the family control over the
group may become weak. There is no way for the family to maintain
effective control over Samsung Electronics, the world’s thirteenth largest
firm, without the ‘assistance’ of Samsung Life. This puts Samsung in the
awkward position that it seems to oppose or resist the government policy.
As a result, the whole discussion on the separation of industry and finance
has somehow become a Samsung issue which is misleading and
unfortunate. The lawmakers seem to try to avoid such an impression, but it
is obvious simply because the Samsung issue stands out in any discussion.

V. Concluding Remarks
As Gilson observed, “the presence of family ownership.. facilitates the
development and maintenance of the reputation necessary for a
corporation’s commercial success “in a bad commercial law environment.65)
The best example is the Wallenberg Sphere in Sweden, a Scandinavian legal

64) See Kim Hwa-Jin, Geumyungui Samseongjeonja [A Samsung Electronics in Finance] 124126 (2014) (S. Kor.).
65) See Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries: Anchoring
Relational Exchange, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 633, 636 (2007).
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system jurisdiction.66) The family business has successfully survived five
generations. The same history of success may repeat in Korea. The first step
would be to remove widespread biases against family-controlled corporate
groups with concentrated ownership by accepting the proposition that they
may be efficient as well.
This Essay examined the controversial corporate governance issues of
Samsung Group in comparison with those of the Wallenberg Sphere. The
core difference between the structure and problems arising there from is
the use of the dual-class commons in Wallenberg. Korean law does not
allow the dual-class commons, so Samsung relies heavily upon circular
shareholding through affiliated firms. This Essay concludes that the
introduction of the dual-class commons in the KCC would ease the pain in
difficult corporate governance problems Samsung and other Korean firms
face should the Wallenberg model be a legitimate one for the Korean
economy and society. This Essay also emphasizes that such a change may
be legitimate if and only if Korean firms commit socially responsible
corporate citizenship.
Finally, the policy issue in Korea now is whether stronger regulation on
governance of corporate groups with non-banking financial institutions is
in order. Samsung is in the middle of the controversy. Special legislative
initiatives have also been taken to address the issue. This Essay briefly
explained and analyzed the recent developments in corporate governance
of non-banking financial institutions in Korea and suggested that further
regulation would not be efficient and rather produce bureaucracy and
corruptive practices. If Samsung did not cause the controversy, it is fair to
say Samsung may be counted as collateral damage.

66) For discussions on the family-controlled U.S. firms, see Danny Miller et al., Are Family
Firms Really Superior Performers?, 13 Journal of Corporate Finance 829 (2007) (“Although
international evidence suggests that families may be unhelpful to firm performance, recent
analyses of U.S. public companies indicate that family firms outperform.”) See also, Belen
Villalonga & Raphael Amit, How do Family Ownership, Control and Management Affect Firm
Value?, 80 Journal of Financial Economics 385 (2006).

